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ABSTRACT
Cloud computing has become popular among businesses that see
information technology as outside their core competencies, demand a
highly flexible computing environment, and seek to achieve more
predictable costs. In some ways, cloud computing resembles IT
outsourcing arrangements used in the financial services industry for
many years; therefore lessons from financial services IT outsourcing
agreements may prove helpful to parties interested in adopting cloud
computing. This article considers the use of “data hostage” clauses in
combination with arbitration or litigation clauses by service providers
and the problems these clauses can cause outsourcing businesses. These
two clauses together can insulate service providers from liability for
material breaches and be used to coerce non-breaching customers into
paying hefty termination fees. Although careful analysis shows that
data hostage clauses may not always be enforceable, few customers are
likely to litigate these cases. This Article considers regulatory and
contract drafting strategies for reducing the risks to outsourcing businesses arising from the use of such clauses.
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INTRODUCTION
Today information technology (IT) is exploring a new frontier: the
cloud. Cloud computing is the enticing alternative to do-it-yourself, inhouse information technology solutions.1 In the cloud computing
model, data is initially captured by the outsourcing business,
transmitted to the service provider, processed by the service provider,
stored within the service provider’s computers, and then remotely
accessed via a network. (In some cases, the data is partially and
periodically downloaded to local servers at the outsourcing business for
local viewing or customized reporting.)2 Simply put, “plugging into the
IT cloud . . . [is] browser access to an application hosted on the Web.”3
1

See Scott Morrison, ‘Cloud Computing’ Makes Gains, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20,
2008, at B3B.
2
J. Nicholas Hoover & Richard Martin, Demystifying the Cloud, INFO. WK.,
June 23, 2008, at 32, available at http://www.informationweek.com/news/services/
hosted_apps/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=208700713 (noting that common characteristics of cloud computing include “IT resources provisioned outside of the
corporate data center, those resources accessed over the Internet, and variable cost.”).
3
Id. at 30. The U.S. Government’s more comprehensive working definition of
“cloud computing” expands upon the simple definition:
Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with
minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This
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For instance, Amazon Web Services, a leader in cloud computing, now
offers data storage and data processing and database management
services—all via the Internet.4 Rather than using on-premises software
and systems and data storage, a user employs those of a vendor
specializing in “cloud” services. The familiar “software as a service”
(SaaS) is one of several service models for cloud computing.5
Critics of the cloud raise concerns over the portability of cloud
computing because the cloud computing model requires that data
reside with the service provider.6 The outsourcing business experiences
the negative impact of this lack of portability, or “vendor lock-in”
phenomenon, when it wants to migrate to another cloud computing
service provider and is confronted with a data hostage clause in its
outsourcing agreement requiring the business to pay an applicable
termination fee in order for the data to be returned.7 This Article will
examine the portability dilemma faced by outsourcing businesses and
propose two possible strategies to resolve the portability dilemma for
future outsourcing businesses.
I. THE PORTABILITY DILEMMA
For years, IT service providers have included a “data hostage”
clause in their outsourcing contracts to discourage customer defections. Such data hostage clauses might include the following language:
Customer consents and agrees and authorizes Service
cloud model promotes availability and is composed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment
models.
Peter Mell & Tim Grance, Draft NIST Definition of Cloud Computing 1 (Oct. 7,
2009), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/cloud-def-v15.doc
(emphasis in original).
4
Hoover & Martin, supra note 2.
5
See Mell & Grance, supra note 3.
6
Bob Preston, Customers Fire a Few Shots at Cloud Computing, INFO. WK., Jun.
16, 2008, at 52, available at http://www.informationweek.com/news/services/dat
a/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=208403766.
7
See Apple Says “Uncle,” CARPENTER LAW OFFICE CLIENT NEWSLETTER (Robert
H. Carpenter, Jr., Plano, Tex.), Jan. Feb. 2007, available at http://0093d40.netsol
host.com/images/Apple_Says_Uncle__Jan._-_Feb._2007__2007.pdf.
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Provider to retain Customer files until (i) Service
Provider is paid in full for (A) all services provided
through the date such Customer files are returned to
Customer; and (B) any and all other amounts that are
due or will become due under this Agreement; (ii)
Service Provider is paid its then standard rates for the
services necessary to return such Customer files; (iii) if

this Agreement is being terminated, Service Provider
is paid any applicable termination fee; and (iv)
Customer has returned to Service Provider all
confidential and proprietary information received from
Service Provider.
When a customer seeks to terminate an outsourcing agreement,
the service provider typically denies that any material breach of contract has occurred or that a customer has any basis to terminate for
cause, and demands payment in full or a large termination fee,
representing liquidated damages for lost business. The service provider
may simply hold the customer’s data hostage until payment is made.
To the extent that outsourcing businesses realize there is a risk of
opportunistic behavior on the part of service providers, they will be less
likely to adopt cloud computing; to the extent that outsourcing
businesses do not recognize the risks up front, outsourcing IT with
services such as cloud computing creates traps for the unwary.
One possible strategy to mitigate this risk, currently used by the
financial industry, is for the outsourcing business to seek shorter
service contract durations. In the past, financial institutions and their
IT service providers have committed to long-term outsourcing
relationships ranging from five to even ten-year terms. More recently it
has become uncommon for service contract terms to exceed five years;
and some are as short as three years. Even renewal terms in current
agreements are narrowing. Renewal terms were often the same as the
initial term; now many are for a single year. Rapid developments in
information technology resulted in Federal bank regulators to issue
this cautionary note:
[C]ontracts need to be flexible, and therefore, should
not be long-term (over five years). It is difficult to
foresee and contract for every possible contingency that
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may arise. Also, business needs change or the market
may evolve in unexpected directions. For these reasons,
OTS discourages long-term contracts. Shorter contracts
may provide more flexibility to meet the challenges of a
changing environment.8
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some cloud computing providers,
probably sensitive to the data portability issue and the barrier it erects
to business migration to the cloud computing model, have shortened
required contract terms or even eliminated them altogether. Such
concessions are, however, unlikely when there are substantial front-end
costs; parties will therefore likely continue to engage in high-stakes
disputes.9
II. CASE STUDY
Because there are no reported decisions that offer a clear solution
to the data portability dilemma, anecdotal evidence of an actual
dispute may be a helpful guide for analysis. The following case study is
based on an actual dispute that settled before going to trial. While the
names are fictional, the parties represent real players in the financial
services IT outsourcing space.
In 2007, when Happy Valley Bancshares renewed its IT
outsourcing contract with Nifty Data Processing for a second five-year
8

OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, THRIFT BULLETIN 82A, THIRD PARTY
ARRANGEMENTS 15 (2004), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/84272.pdf.
This bulletin, like its 2003 predecessor, mandates (at least for the thrifts that OTS
regulates) a shortening of contract terms, a process that had already begun taking
place through outsourcing by U.S. financial institutions of back office business.
9
The author’s experience in this field spans the last decade. As legal counsel for
IT service providers, he has prosecuted the collection of liquidated damages in over
ten such disputes, many involving more than a million dollars claimed against a
serviced business. In every case except two, the serviced business conceded payment
of liquidated damages in order to secure its data. In the two exceptions, the serviced
business filed preemptive actions in state courts that ultimately forced the service
provider to relent rather than suffer negative publicity. Alltel Info. Svcs., Inc. v. Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., 194 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999), is the only reported decision
addressing termination of an IT services outsourcing contract and payment of
liquidated damages for the termination. The Alltel claim for $1.4 million
demonstrates the high-stakes nature of such disputes.
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term, Nifty agreed to improve its service to remain competitive. There
were four significant provisions included in the IT outsourcing
contract: (1) Happy Valley retains ownership of the data after
transmittal to Nifty and Nifty acknowledges that such data is Happy
Valley’s exclusive property; (2) Nifty accepts possession of the data
subject to the agreed upon restrictions on use; (3) any claim arising
from the agreement is subject to arbitration; and (4) data is subject to a
hostage clause.10
When Nifty failed to meet the newly negotiated service level
agreements because, unlike its competitors, it was unable to meet
emerging performance standards, Happy Valley claimed that Nifty had
materially breached the new IT outsourcing contract.11 Happy Valley
entered into negotiations with a different IT vendor and demanded
that Nifty surrender Happy Valley’s customer data in its most portable
or native format12 so the change in vendors could proceed. Nifty
denied any contract breach and refused to turn over any of its data
unless Happy Valley paid four million dollars in liquidated damages
for contract termination.13 Analysis of the outsourcing relationship
10

Provisions such as “Nifty further acknowledges and agrees that all confidential
data described in this Agreement is and constitutes information that belongs wholly
to and is the exclusive property of Happy Valley” and “Confidential data will at no
time be used by Nifty directly or indirectly other than as necessary to carry out its
obligations under and for purposes authorized in this Agreement” are typical for
financial institution IT services outsourcing contracts. See FED. FIN. INST.
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK, OUTSOURCING TECHNOLOGY SERVICES BOOKLET 13 (2004) [hereinafter OUTSOURCING TECHNOLOGY
SERVICES], available at http://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/booklets/outsourcing/
Outsourcing_Booklet.pdf.
11
Service level agreements (SLAs) are metrics prescribed in an IT services contract used to measure the service provider’s performance. Depending upon the
contract’s terms, failure to meet an SLA may constitute a material breach of the
contract, or it may simply give rise to a nonperformance monetary credit against the
contract’s service charges.
12
PCMag.com Encyclopedia, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/02
542,t=native+format&i=47655,00.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2009) (defining native
format as the most complete and portable data file format that a computer
application reads and writes).
13
Early contract terminations usually invoke liquidated damages clauses that
require payment of all or a large portion of the payments that would have been made
if the contract had continued. These payments are almost always a substantial sum.
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and terms of the agreement suggests Happy Valley may have not only
contract claims against Nifty, but also tort claims.
A. Tort Claims Arising from Contracts
A tort is “a breach of a duty that the law imposes on persons who
stand in a particular relation to one another.”14 Happy Valley satisfies
the three requirements for an action in tort by demonstrating: (1) the
existence of Nifty’s duty to Happy Valley, (2) Nifty’s breach of that
duty, and (3) damages proximately caused by the breach. Happy Valley
claims the IT outsourcing contract created a bailment for hire in which
Happy Valley entrusted its property to Nifty for specific and limited
purposes and for which Happy Valley paid Nifty. Nifty, a bailee, rightfully came into possession of the property, but owed Happy Valley a
duty to return the data upon demand.15 Because Nifty breached its
duty as a bailee by failing to return the property upon demand, Happy
Valley was prevented from transferring to a new service provider and
therefore suffered non-economic damages and incidental economic
damages.
At common law, Happy Valley would have had a remedy against
Nifty in either detinue or replevin for return of personal property that
was lawfully obtained but wrongfully detained after Happy Valley’s
demand for its return.16 Because section 78.01 of the Florida Statutes
provides a remedy of replevin,17 and the action of detinue is
14

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1526 (8th ed. 2004).
See So. Mill Creek Prod. Co. v. Ferrell Jewelers of Tampa, Inc., 194 So. 2d 690
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); S. Indus. Sav. Bank v. Greene, 224 So. 2d 416, 418-19
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 232 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1969) (noting that the
compensated bailee, when compared to an involuntary or gratuitous bailee, owes the
bailor the highest duty of care with respect to bailed property).
16
Williams Mgmt. Enter., Inc. v. Buonauro, 489 So.2d 160, 161 n.1 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986).
17
FLA. STAT. § 78.01 (2009). Florida breaks with the line of cases exemplified by
S. Cent. Bell Telephone Co. v. Barthelemy, 643 So. 2d 1240 (La. 1994) (holding
computer software recorded on disks, tapes, or hard drives have a physical form and
are thus subject to tangible personal property tax) and instead decides that “the
physical components of software—the same discs, tapes, hard drives, etc.—discussed by
the Louisiana court, are only ‘tangential incidents’ of the program” and, thus, are not
tangible personal property subject to taxation. Gilreath v. Gen. Elec. Co., 751 So. 2d
15
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considered obsolete in Florida, Happy Valley chose to sue Nifty pursuant to the Florida replevin statute.18
The legal remedy of replevin arises out of a tort claim rather than a
contract claim.19 However, the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests that
either a tort claim or a contract claim may be appropriate: “an act and
its consequences may be both a tort and a breach of contract. . . .
When this is so, the injured person, although barred by a statute from
maintaining an action of tort may not be barred from enforcing his
contractual . . . right or vice versa.”20 Florida follows this rule, at least
when the tort is independent from the underlying contract.21
Therefore, Happy Valley may recover on a tort claim arising from a
contractual relationship “if the defendant’s conduct constituted a
separate and independent tort.”22
705, 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). Nevertheless, in the replevin context, this
analysis is not applied:
[I]ntangible personal property must be clearly distinguished from
tangible evidence of intangible property, which tangible evidence
can usually be identified and, when it can be, such tangible
evidence may be the subject of an action of replevin when the
issue is who is entitled to the immediate possession of the physical
object, but not when the issue is the ownership of the intangible
right that is represented by the tangible evidence.
Williams Mgmt. Enter., 489 So. 2d at 163-64 (footnotes omitted). Because Happy
Valley’s ownership of the underlying customer was not in doubt, Happy Valley could
have replevied physical objects containing the data.
18
See generally Williams Mgmt. Enter., 489 So.2d at 161 n.1 (noting that
“[o]riginally detinue was purely an action to recover goods in specie, if obtainable,
and if not, their value at the time of the verdict, in cases where there was no wrongful
taking. . . . [Although] the action of detinue has never been formally abolished, it is
usually said that the action of detinue is obsolete because in Florida, now by statute,
replevin relates to property both wrongfully taken and wrongfully detained.”).
19
Id. at 161.
20
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 cmt. b (1979) (emphasis added).
21
HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla.
1996) (stating that “[w]here a contract exists, a tort action will lie for either
intentional or negligent acts considered to be independent from acts that breached
the contract.”). Cf. Samuels v. King Motor Co., 782 So.2d 489, 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (allowing alternative counts in contract and tort for claims arising from a
contract of bailment).
22
Michael Dorff, Attaching Torts Claims to Contract Actions: An Economic Analysis
of Contort, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 390, 406 (1997). But see id. at 408-10 (noting this
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The “contort” dilemma, and the analysis of whether an action
should be brought in contract or in tort, can also be explained this
way:
Ordinarily, a breach of contract is not a tort . . . .
However, a contract may create a state of things which
furnishes the occasion of a tort, so that the negligent
performance of a contract may give rise to an action in
tort, if the duty exists independently of the
performance of the contract. The contract then creates
the relation out of which grows the duty to use care in
the performance of a responsibility prescribed by the
contract.23
While this formulation seems much broader than, and possibly at
odds with, Florida’s rule, these approaches can be reconciled:
There are, however, a few situations in which failure to
perform a contract may amount to a tort . . . . [One]
type of exception arises where the contract results in or
accompanies some relation between the parties which
the law recognizes as giving rise to a duty of affirmative
care. The typical case is that of a bailment, where the
bare fact that the defendant has possession of the
“straightforward” rule has spawned competing analytical frameworks).
23
57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 110 (2004) (footnotes omitted). Much of the
discussion of contorts, and whether a plaintiff who is in contractual privity with the
defendant should be barred from maintaining a tort claim, centers on money
damages and application of the economic loss rule, which “is designed to prevent
parties to a contract from circumventing the allocation of losses set forth in the
contract by bringing an action for economic loss in tort.” Indemnity Ins. Co. of No.
Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. 2004). See also Amy G.
Doehring, Blurring the Distinction between Contract and Tort: Courts Permitting Business
Plaintiffs to Recover Tort Damages for Breach of Contract, 12 BUS. TORTS J. 2, 1 (2005),
available at www.mwe.com/info/pubs/aba05.pdf. Because Happy Valley primarily
asked for recovery of its property and only economic loss incidental to the wrongful
restraint (damages specifically allowed by Florida’s statutory replevin action) the
economic loss rule has no application in the analysis of the viability of Happy
Valley’s tort claim. FLA. STAT. § 78.01 (2009) (stating that “[a] person whose personal
property is wrongfully detained . . . may . . . recover . . . any damages sustained by
reason of the wrongful . . . detention”).
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plaintiff’s property is enough to create the duty, and it
would exist if there were no contract at all and the
goods were found on the highway.24
Nifty, the bailee for hire—a situation based upon the contract
between the parties—owed a duty to Happy Valley, the bailor, to use
due care in holding bailor’s property and to return it upon demand.25
When Nifty failed to return the property and proximately caused
damages to Happy Valley, Happy Valley was able to bring a tort claim
against Nifty for replevin under section 78.01 of Florida Statutes.
While Happy Valley may theoretically bring this tort claim against
Nifty, the data hostage and arbitration clauses in the IT outsourcing
contract data hostage clause attempt to interpose a contractual bar to
Happy Valley’s suit.
B. Exculpatory Contract Provisions
The data hostage clause requires Happy Valley to pay Nifty a
termination fee when terminating without cause. The self-help remedy
provided by the data hostage clause allows the service provider to make
the initial determination whether it has breached the contract. While
subsequent litigation or arbitration might result in a victory for the
outsourcing business, the aggrieved customer may be unable to leave
its data in possession of the service provider long enough to achieve
victory.
IT services outsourcing agreements typically include arbitration
clauses or litigation provisions governing choice of law and forum.
Happy Valley’s contract with Nifty included an arbitration clause: “any
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration.” In recognition of this
provision, Happy Valley filed a demand for arbitration claiming that
Nifty had materially breached the IT outsourcing contract. The
demand for arbitration claimed money damages caused by Nifty’s
breaches and requested an award of specific performance of Nifty’s
24

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 66263 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted). See also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 5
(2000).
25
See So. Mill Creek Prod. Co., 194 So. 2d 690.
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obligation to return Happy Valley’s data so that the conversion to a
new service provider could take place. The arbitration, however,
proceeded very slowly.
The data hostage and arbitration clauses together may give a
breaching service provider the leverage to coerce an outsourcing
business to pay a termination fee to which it is not entitled. To proceed with the tort claim in court, Happy Valley must demonstrate that
the clauses taken together constitute exculpatory clauses and are thus
unenforceable. Restatement (Second) of Contracts states exculpatory
contract clauses are unenforceable when “[a] term exempting a party
from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy.”26
In Florida exculpatory contract clauses may be enforceable, but:
As frequently recognized by the Florida courts, exculpatory clauses [not only for negligent, but also for
willful, malicious or grossly negligent actions] are not
favored in the law, and Florida law requires that such
clauses be strictly construed against the party claiming
to be relieved of liability. Such clauses are enforceable
only where and to the extent that the intention to be
relieved was made clear and unequivocal in the
contract, and the wording must be so clear and
understandable that an ordinary and knowledgeable
party will know what he is contracting away.27
In O’Connell v. Walt Disney World Co. the court discusses an exculpatory contract clause in contrast to an indemnification or an
assumption of risk clause. In the discussion, the court focuses on the
effect of the clauses and concludes that such clauses, which have
similar purposes and effects, are subject to the same disfavor as exculpatory clauses.28 Under this functional analysis, the hostage clause and
the arbitration agreement in Nifty’s data processing contract immunize
26

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(1) (1981).
Southworth & McGill, P.A. v. So. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 580 So. 2d 628, 634
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (footnote and citation omitted).
28
O’Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
27
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Nifty from the consequences of its tortious conduct and, thus, should
be disfavored and subject to careful scrutiny.
To be enforceable against Happy Valley, the intention of the clause
must be “clear and unequivocal” and the contractual language must
convey in an understandable way the consequences of the clause.29
Although Happy Valley is in some ways a sophisticated business entity,
it is unclear whether the implications of the data hostage clause and
arbitration clause taken together were conveyed in a manner that made
these consequences clear.30
III. TWO STRATEGIES TO MITIGATE THE IMPACT OF DATA HOSTAGE
CLAUSES
It is unlikely that service providers will voluntarily stop requiring
their outsourcing customers to agree to data hostage clauses. Moreover, outsourcing customers are unlikely to litigate in data hostage
situations. It is therefore unlikely that case law will develop in this area
to clarify the extent to which data hostage clauses are enforceable.
There are two possible solutions to the data hostage dilemma; the first
requires government intervention while the second requires addition
of a contract term creating a private expedited dispute resolution
mechanism to remove the data from the service provider while
arbitration or litigation proceeds.
A. Government Intervention
Financial institution regulators might at least prohibit the use of
data hostage terms in outsourcing contracts entered into by regulated
financial institutions. Federal regulators, particularly those for banking
29

Id.
While beyond the scope of this article, it may in fact be possible, at least under
Florida’s formulation of the law, to construct a data hostage clause and dispute
resolution mechanism that overcomes the legal disfavor of such clauses and satisfies
requirements for enforceability. See Glenn D. West & W. Benton Lewis, Jr.,
Contracting to Avoid Extra-Contractual Liability—Can Your Contractual Deal Ever Really Be
the “Entire” Deal?, 64 BUS. LAW. 999 (2009) (examining the effectiveness of exculpatory contract provisions, in the context of fraud and negligent misrepresentation
claims, in limiting tort liability).
30
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institutions, may regulate and examine those companies that provide
services to Federally-chartered or Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation-insured entities.31 However, direct regulation in this form
(as opposed to examinations that occur on a regular basis) rarely
occurs.
Taking a more indirect approach to the problem, financial regulators might promote “best practices” for IT outsourcing. For example,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation began requiring insured
banks and thrifts to maintain certain deposit data in specific formats,
regardless of whether they process the data in-house or outsource the
services.32 Further, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council, which is a cooperative of all Federal banking regulators, long
ago issued examinations guidance that advises directly on certain
substantive terms in IT outsourcing contracts.33 Federal and state
regulators could continue to strengthen their guidance to regulated
institutions regarding the dangers of data hostage clauses, or even
prohibit their use altogether. This approach could increase data
portability for businesses that employ cloud computing services.
B. Private Choice
Parties to IT outsourcing contracts could reduce the leverage
service providers enjoy by providing for more expeditious resolution of
disputes. This could be done by drafting a rapid resolution
mechanism. This mechanism would permit the parties to submit
limited evidence to a single, neutral decision maker who is required to
decide quickly whether a terminating customer is likely to prevail in
arbitration or litigation. The standard could be much like that applied
in Federal courts for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, i.e.,
whether the party seeking the preliminary injunction is “likely to
succeed on the merits.”34
31

See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(7)(D), 1867(c) (2006).
See 12 C.F.R. § 360.9 (2009) (stating the FDIC rule requiring that major
banks keep deposit data in specific format to assist in deposit insurance determinations).
33
See OUTSOURCING TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, supra note 10, at 12–19.
34
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).
32
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If the neutral decision maker finds that the customer seeking return of its data without payment of the termination fee meets the
standard, then the service provider would be compelled to first deliver
the data and then submit the dispute to arbitration or litigation, as
agreed in the parties’ contract. Such a rapid resolution mechanism
could be cast as a mandatory, binding arbitration provision that is
enforceable pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.35
CONCLUSION
The data portability discussion among IT cloud computing service
providers is a familiar one. Financial institutions have been outsourcing data processing to service providers for years. These service
provider arrangements are precursors to the services provided by
today’s cloud computing companies.
Typical contract provisions that have hindered or even prevented
defections from one service provider to another have been problematic
for the financial services industry. If they are used in cloud computing,
then they may become problematic in other industries as well.
Outsourcing businesses may not recognize the coercive power their
service providers stand to gain when data hostage clauses are combined
with dispute resolution clauses that permit substantial delays in
resolving disputes.
In regulated industries, like financial services, regulators can address the problem and adopt remedial measures to discourage or
eliminate the unfairness that data hostage clauses impose. In other
industries, outsourcing businesses could reduce the risk of paying
substantial termination fees, even to service providers that have
breached their agreements, by devising expedited dispute resolution
terms.

35

See AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH COMMEN2.9 and cmt. (2001) (offering a similar provision to resolve purchase price
adjustment disputes in asset purchase transactions and discussing its enforceability as
an agreement to arbitrate).
TARY §

